In a pleasant turn of events, the most provocative remarks from day one of the IP & Antitrust Conference were provided by neither a practitioner nor an academic, but by FTC Commissioner Tom Rosch. A PDF of Commissioner Rosch's remarks is available from the FTC here.
Commissioner Rosch took as his topic the question of whether and to what extent restraints affecting pure innovation markets should be challenged by regulators. In considering the question, he undertook a review of academic literature, the history of regulation of such markets, the practical problems encountered throughout that history, and the prominent legal issues raised in that history.
His review of the academic literature recounted Schumpeter's arguments in favor of concentration in innovation markets and Arrow's arguments in favor of more competition in such markets. His purpose was not to deal with the nuances of these authors' work, but rather to point out that views are divided within the academy as to what level of concentration or competition is best to foster innovation. His remarks called to my attention the extraordinary remarks of Justice Scalia in the 2004 Trinko decision:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices–at least for a short period–is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.
Commissioner Rosch insisted that this was dicta in the Trinko decision. Nonetheless it is a clear statement of what would be called a Schumpeterean view of competition in innovation markets.
Next came a summary of the last few decades of the history of regulation of innovation markets. Commissioner Rosch is an eyewitness to much of this history. He was working at the FTC, for example, when Xerox was investigated in 1974 on the theory that its patent portfolio and joint venture with another company were anticompetitive. His conclusion, however, was that through this history, there was not a single instance in which the agency had made a successful challenge to allegedly anticompetitive conduct in an innovation market.
Commissioner Rosch left off his survey of the regulation of innovation markets with the provocative observation that innovation is "necessarily dynamic and evolving" and that static market definitions (such as the definitions required under Philadelphia Bank or the 2 year rule under the guidelines for review of horizontal restraints) make no sense in such markets.
Regular readers of Broken Symmetry will appreciate how these words struck a chord with me. Only a few weeks ago we enjoyed hearing from guest blogger Michael A. Gollin about the importance of a dynamic equilibrium approach to understanding IP. Without competition regulatory authorities onboard with any industry plan to plant a new redwood forest, it is only too likely that industry agreements to conserve or preserve certain resources will be challenged as anticompetitive conduct ("You logging companies can't agree to stop other companies from cutting down those trees!").
The challenge has now been laid down by Commissioner Rosch. It is up to this generation of academics, practitioners, and regulators to rethink how we regulate markets to accommodate growth that occurs on a week-to-week basis rather than a year-to-year or decade-to-decade basis. What new standards can be applied to harmonize the goals of antitrust and IP law? How can academics make a dynamic theory of innovation easy enough for everybody involved -- business people, politicians, and the public -- to agree and buy in to a new model?
At the meeting, Commissioner Rosch specifically implicated the market definition rule as an unnecessary distraction to determining whether anticompetitive conduct has occurred in an innovation market. How can such markets be well-defined when they are so rapidly changing? He pointed to an interchange between Judges Douglas Ginsburg and Diane Wood on this question, although I didn't quite catch whether this was on the record for them. (They sit on different courts, but both teach at the University of Chicago.)
Here are a few of my own thoughts on these matters: besides market definition, even market share is not a meaningful figure if such markets are considered at only a single moment in time. Moving from a static to a dynamic picture of IP and Antitrust will require us to take multiple snapshots in time. Unfortunately, what we have going against us in setting up a new model are the facts that dominant mental models of economic equilibrium are time-independent and the accounting theory behind our financial statements is based on a static model of firm value in liquidation.
In the future, time-dependent measures, such as cash-flow per unit time, will provide a more reliable way to measure the effect of a given activity within an innovation market. The effect of given activities might even be deconvoluted out of a time-series of cash flows -- i.e., by looking at how growth curves of accounts inside various firms changed (or didn't change) as the result of a questionable activity, we might be able to tell whether that activity had an anticompetitive effect.
So for example, it might make more sense to gather statistics on the average internal rate of return for successful and unsuccessful startups in a given market. Perhaps only startups over a certain minimum IRR and annual revenue should be subject to antitrust scrutiny. Growth below that threshold (which probably is technology dependent; consumer internet IRRs are right now much higher than semiconductor IRRs) is not subject to review because it is unlikely to have been due to collusion.
Moreover, competition regulatory authorities should take into account how macroeconomic factors (such as the economic inaccessibility of IPOs for companies with under several hundred million dollars in revenue) can influence competition. In fact, if the FTC really wanted to promote competition, then the first thing it should do is sit down with the SEC and identify exactly who each agency seeks to protect, and what rules are designed to do that. As Hume would have said, whatever remains should be cast to the flames. Technological change has happened fast enough so that incremental changes to the regulatory regimes within these agencies will probably not get the job done.
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